Türkiye-Ethiopia Relations: A Historical and Strategic Overview
By Yunus Turhan
Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University
Historical Ties
Türkiye and Ethiopia share the longest-standing diplomatic relations on the African continent, a connection that dates back to 1896. This initial contact was established through correspondence between Sultan Abdulhamid II of Türkiye and Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia. The establishment of a Turkish Consulate in Harar in 1912 was a significant milestone, marking the beginning of institutional ties. In 1926, Türkiye solidified its presence in Sub-Saharan Africa by inaugurating its first resident embassy in Addis Ababa, laying a foundation for future cooperation.
This diplomatic relationship continued to deepen through a series of exchanges between Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Haile Selassie I, totaling 35 letters and telegrams. Notably, the signing of the “Ethiopia–Türkiye Treaty of Friendship and Commerce” in March 1936, just before the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, reinforced the legal and diplomatic framework of their relations. During the Italian invasion, Turkish military personnel volunteered alongside Ethiopian forces, symbolizing a strong bond forged in adversity.
Modern Diplomatic Engagement
Fast forward to March 1, 2005, when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Addis Ababa marked a watershed moment. This was Türkiye’s first prime ministerial-level visit to Sub-Saharan Africa, leading to tangible outcomes, including Türkiye gaining observer status in the African Union. This venture catalyzed Türkiye’s “Africa Initiative,” transitioning it from rhetoric to a more structured and practice-oriented foreign policy.
Economic Cooperation
Ethiopia’s demographic and economic landscape is vital to its bilateral relations with Türkiye. Home to approximately 128.7 million people—a majority of whom are youth—Ethiopia boasts one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies. The country’s GDP growth rate of 7.2% for the 2023-2024 period outperforms the continental average, fostering a fertile ground for enhanced commercial relations.
In 2020, Türkiye was among the top three import sources for Ethiopia, capturing a 5.7% market share. More than 150 Turkish companies operate in various sectors like textiles, construction, and manufacturing, with an investment volume peaking at around $2.5 billion, positioning Türkiye as the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia. Yet, recent trends show a decline in bilateral trade volume, signaling an evolving marketplace.
Shifts in Geopolitical Alliances
Ethiopia’s recent pivot towards diversifying its foreign trade partnerships highlights a significant shift. By 2024, the United Arab Emirates emerged as Ethiopia’s leading trade partner, with exports exceeding $1 billion and imports around $853 million. Notably, China leads on the import side with approximately $3 billion, illustrating Ethiopia’s new economic orientation towards the UAE-China axis.
Maritime Aspirations
A vital aspect of Ethiopia’s foreign policy is its pursuit of maritime access, given that approximately 90% of its foreign trade passes through Djibouti. In seeking to reduce dependency on this singular access point, Ethiopia has turned its attention to Somaliland, utilizing its ties with the UAE to pursue new maritime routes. Notably, the Berbera Port in Somaliland, operated by UAE-based DP World since 2017, provides a strategic route through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, critical for global trade.
The Somaliland Situation
The “Ethiopia–Somaliland Protocol,” signed in January 2024, proposed granting the Ethiopian Navy 20 kilometers of maritime access in exchange for recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state. This controversial move diverges from Türkiye’s supportive stance towards Somalia’s unitary structure and has triggered a series of diplomatic efforts to mediate regional tensions. Ankara’s engagement culminated in the “Ethiopia–Somalia Ankara Declaration,” signed in December 2024, aiming to foster dialogue rather than unilateral action.
The geopolitical ramifications of these developments are intricate, especially following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025. Ethiopia’s evolving position on Somaliland underscores the delicate balance it must strike in the region, particularly given the internal strife it faces.
Internal Struggles
Ethiopia has been grappling with internal conflict, notably the Tigray War from 2020 to 2022, and rising tensions with Eritrea. By 2024, unrest had flared in Oromia, with Fano militias gaining prominence in Amhara. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s centralization reforms began to strain the federal structure, showcasing the complexities that challenge Ethiopia’s regional ambitions.
The Strategic Imperative for Maritime Access
Abiy Ahmed has aptly articulated the urgency for Ethiopia to escape its “geographical prison,” framing maritime access as not merely an economic goal but as a strategic necessity. Türkiye’s involvement is crucial; Ankara has emphasized the importance of regional consensus in achieving Ethiopia’s maritime objectives, particularly in the shifting geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa.
President Erdogan’s visit to Ethiopia symbolizes a broader strategic partnership that could catalyze collaborative efforts in defense, infrastructure, and commercial ventures across the region. This partnership may also influence the larger geopolitical dynamics, from Somalia’s territorial integrity to the ongoing tensions in Sudan and the Ethiopia-Egypt axis, positioning Türkiye as a key player in controlling Israel’s expanding influence.
President Erdogan’s engagement signifies a crucial moment in Türkiye’s pursuit of a strategy built on inclusive alliances centered around regional security—marking an evolution in both nations’ diplomatic trajectories in a rapidly changing world.